It Takes A Network

One of the people at the polls made a funny comment to me. I was talking casually with them about how we did things, and she said that in the years since we'd started, I'd loosened up quite a bit. I was surprised, and asked what she meant. "Well ", she said, "the first time we did this, you were pretty hands-on. You wanted to be involved in everything we did. Which makes sense, because we were all new to this. But over time, you got to the point where you trusted us to do what we were supposed to do. You only got involved with the things where we actually needed you."

I thought that was a great compliment. The idea of leadership by exception, if I can use that phrase, came to mind this afternoon when I was reading an article in the Wilson Quarterly called Learning from Al Qaeda, about the command structure used by that organization. The article's based on one in Foreign Policy, It Takes A Network, where Stanley McChrystal talks about what they learned over time regarding the need for command-and-control structure to infuse an organization and keep it effective and on-track. They found that what worked for the American military was virtually the opposite of what worked for AQI:

Like all too many military forces in history, we initially saw our enemy as we viewed ourselves.... By habit, we started mapping the organization in a traditional military structure, with tiers and rows. At the top was Zarqawi, below him a cascade of lieutenants and foot soldiers. But the closer we looked, the more the model didn't hold. Al Qaeda in Iraq's lieutenants did not wait for memos from their superiors, much less orders from bin Laden. Decisions were not centralized, but were made quickly and communicated laterally across the organization. Zarqawi's fighters were adapted to the areas they haunted, like Fallujah and Qaim in Iraq's western Anbar province, and yet through modern technology were closely linked to the rest of the province and country.

Essentially, they found that because of the networked structure that AQI used -- one based not on rigid authority but on location, mission, and even who you were married to -- the enemy was nimble; because of the hierarchical structure that the US military used, they were not.

So they changed.

But fashioning ourselves to counter our enemy's network was easier said than done, especially because it took time to learn what, exactly, made a network different. As we studied, experimented, and adjusted, it became apparent that an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act. ... Although we got our message out differently than did our enemies, both organizations increasingly shared basic attributes that define an effective network. Decisions were decentralized and cut laterally across the organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away and diverse cultures meshed. The network expanded to include more groups, including unconventional actors. It valued competency above all else -- including rank. It sought a clear and evolving definition of the problem and constantly self-analyzed, revisiting its structure, aims, and processes, as well as those of the enemy. Most importantly, the network continually grew the capacity to inform itself.

It's a fascinating article.